LEXO PA REKLAMA!

SHKARKO APP

"The devil we know": Does the West want Erdogan to win?

2023-05-04 07:51:00, Blog Omer Taspinar
"The devil we know": Does the West want Erdogan to win?
Illustrative photo

Is there a Western preference for the winner as Turkey approaches a major turning point on May 14? Would the United States and Europe prefer that current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stay in power, or do they finally want to see a change in Ankara?

Conspiracy-prone Turkish public opinion is often obsessed with outside forces seeking to dictate the country's destiny. Of course, it is up to the Turks to do this in the presidential and parliamentary elections.

But because Erdogan is a master tactician at using such anti-Western domestic sentiment to his advantage, in the West, and especially in Washington, there is a very cautious demeanor not to take sides, beyond statements that remember the importance of "free and fair" elections.

However, beneath the surface there seems to be a surprisingly unspoken and very selfish Western preference. And unfortunately, she is wrong. Normally, the autocratic tendencies in Erdogan's Turkey, coupled with a foreign policy that is blocking Sweden's NATO membership and keeping Putin's Russia as a key economic and military partner, should simplify things for the West.

However, the picture gets murkier if you dig a little deeper. For example, in Washington dominates the idea of ??post-Erdogan Ankara, it will not be fundamentally different in foreign policy, and that the small change will be more in style than in the essence of the system.

Also, it is popularly assumed that the two fundamental problems on the Turkish-American agenda - mainly Ankara's frustration with US support for the Syrian Kurds and Washington's frustration with Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems - have not likely to disappear with an opposition victory.

Similarly, if Erdogan loses the election, no one expects a radical departure from Turkey's current positions in Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean or the Aegean Sea. Turkish nationalism and the quest for strategic autonomy and independence are likely to continue to be the main driving vectors of Turkish foreign policy.

And what can be said about the expectations of the Turkish opposition and the Middle East? Ironically, under Erdo?an's leadership, a major turnaround took place over the past 2 years. Given the dire state of the Turkish economy, Erdogan's desperate need for cash has brought about a major shift in Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

This approach requires a review of Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which in turn helped improve relations with Israel and Egypt. Such a rapid re-calibration in Turkish foreign policy probably strengthened Erdogan's image in the West as a pragmatic opportunist rather than an Islamist ideologue.

So it's no surprise that a former US ambassador to Ankara, who has a long history of relations with Erdogan, had no problem expressing his preference for him as "the Devil we know".

Today, in the hope of repatriating some of the 4 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, Erdogan is even seeking to normalize relations with Bashar Al-Assad's Syria, a regime that only a few years ago he was trying to topple. The issue of Syrian refugees brings us to Europe's attitudes towards Erdogan.

Normally, France, Germany and Italy, as well as other European countries such as Greece and Cyprus, which are often victims of Erdogan's bellicose language, should in principle be in favor of a change of power in Ankara. However, there is some concern in France and Germany that a new Turkish government under the leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu will want to revise the 2016 refugee pact signed between Ankara and Brussels.

At that time, Brussels offered 6 billion euros, so that Ankara would keep the Syrian refugees themselves and not allow them to move to the countries of the union. And at that time, Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition, the secular and social democratic Republican People's Party (CHP), strongly opposed this agreement. Today, Kilicdaroglu is running against Erdogan as the joint candidate of a coalition of 6 political parties, including an extremist nationalist political force.

The campaign platform of this "National Alliance" is dedicated to improving relations with the EU, but also aims to renegotiate the refugee agreement, based on what Kilicdaroglu calls the "Turkey first" approach.

Is Europe ready to reach out to a post-Erdogan Turkey that wants better relations in pursuit of full membership, as well as a new refugee deal that better protects Turkish national interests? The answer is “no. Neither France nor Germany are willing to start talks on Turkey's EU membership, a process long forgotten. 

And of course there is no will to accept more refugees in Europe. That's why it might be easier to get along in a transactional relationship with a full-throated nationalist like Erdogan, who has burned many bridges of cooperation with Brussels, and who is the "Devil" they know.

And an angry autocrat with an undemocratic "suit" on his body is much easier to reject than a democratic Turkey, which seeks to revive its European vocation.

I was surprised during a recent visit to Athens to see that the Greek foreign policy establishment seemed perfectly happy with the prospect of Erdogan winning the upcoming elections, based on a purely realpolitik and cynical perspective.

Greece's current position can be explained by the fact that an autocratic Erdogan, with an unpredictable behavior that constantly threatens neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, creates sympathy for Athens in the West.

It is no coincidence that Greek-American relations are currently at an all-time high, in part due to Turkey's unreliability as a NATO partner. After 20 years of relationship with him, for Greece Erdogan is really the "Devil" they know, in a country where they don't see "Angels".

But such prospects for Erdogan are short-sighted and dangerous. There are at least 2 main problems with considering Erdogan as the evil that the West already knows. The first is the case to give democracy a chance in these elections. Autocrats like Putin and Erdogan are almost always inclined to brutally intervene in their country's foreign policy and make bad decisions.

Does Greece really want to risk war with an increasingly powerful and tyrannical neighbor? Does Washington really prefer a repressive and combative Turkey to the alternative that seeks a democratic solution to its problem with the Kurds?

And does Europe really think that an autocratic Turkey that it can easily say no to is a better alternative than a democratizing Ankara that will inevitably turn more pro-EU and anti-Russian?

The second reason Kilicdaroglu deserves a chance on May 14 is because the choice is not between angels and devils. As argued in the case of the Brazilian election between Lula and Bolsonaro, Kilicdaroglu is not the door to Heaven. He is the door from Hell. Note: Omer Taspinar, professor of security studies at the National Defense University in Washington./ Adapted from CNA.al

Lajmet e fundit nga