Putin's failures could make Russia even more unpredictable and dangerous

2023-08-15 07:56:00, Kosova & Bota Alessandro Cappelli

Putin's failures could make Russia even more unpredictable and dangerous

Illustrative photo

Vladimir Putin was convinced that he would conquer Kiev in a few days. He envisioned a quick and easy victory. It was February 24, 2022, when the invasion of Ukraine began. A year and a half later, the only thing that Putin has managed to show is that, unlike what happens inside the borders of Russia, when he crosses the borders of his country, he cannot distort reality as he would like, and as his regime's propaganda in Russia has done for years.

Putin's power structure is suffering successive blows. As the weeks and months passed, the conquered territories became difficult to hold. The mass mobilization announced last fall caused discontent. Western sanctions weakened an already fragile economy.

Then there was an attempted coup by Wagner's mercenary troops led by Yevgeny Prigozhin. In a more general context, the progress of the conflict has highlighted the vulnerability of Russian military positions, as well as the fragility of the convictions of the Kremlin elite.

At first glance, these mistakes do not seem to have shaken a monolithic and authoritarian state. But the apparent indifference of Moscow's leaders can be deceiving. "It is becoming more and more difficult for the Kremlin to sweep the dust under the carpet" - says Tatiana Stanovaja, founder of the "R.Politik" analysis center.

It seems that the war has caused internal changes in the Putin regime, a mutation in the perception that the elites have of the head of the Kremlin, as well as in the attitude of public opinion towards the war. "The mistakes of Putin and his entourage have further revealed the great flaws of the regime: the classic tendency of the Russian authorities to underestimate the political risks at the domestic level, the tendency to ignore the long-term developments of any decision and the inability to to take responsibility for the problems that the war is bringing to an already fragile country" - writes Stanovaja again.

Cracks in Putin's authoritarian system are not necessarily a prelude to a change at the top of the regime. And even less suggest that we have a Russia that has entered its path towards a democratic and liberal future. In fact, they may pave the way for an even more radicalized, aggressive, and ruthless regime.

An authoritarian and brutal order created by Putin, which risks collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions, becoming increasingly distorted, neurotic, unpredictable and therefore dangerous. For all analysts of international politics, the point of no return is Wagner's attempted coup, even though it stopped 200 kilometers from Moscow.

The idea that the rest of the world saw for a few hours - thanks to images circulating on social media and on TV - an operation that could bring about a regime change, has deepened all the internal divisions in Russia that had been widened by the failure. of the invasion of Ukraine.

It's just that the tensions won't push the Russian elite and populace to stop Putin's madness. For example, Prigozhin's rebellion cannot be analyzed as the operation of a powerful actor of the regime that rejects the invasion of Ukraine. He is rather a critic out of dissatisfaction with the inefficient continuation of the war.

Even the reactions to drone attacks and incursions into Russian territory are not pushing the Russian public to call for Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine. This is also because for most Russians Ukraine is seen as an existential threat to Russia, no matter how ridiculous this claim may seem.

"The Russian population is becoming more and more desperate, anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian, while the Russian elites are becoming more and more anxious and nervous," writes Foreign Affairs. "Most of the high officials, businessmen and politicians were hoping for the start of the war. But now they find themselves hostage to Putin's ambitions.

Grupet më agresive dhe më të fuqishme, si komanda ushtarake ose të ashtuquajturit çekistë në radhët e aparatit të sigurisë kombëtare, do të përpiqen të garantojnë rendin për ta forcuar aftësinë e regjimit për vazhdimin e luftës, për të shmangur humbjen por edhe përpjekjen për të organizuar ndonjë rebelim tjetër në të ardhmen”- thekson më tej revista amerikane.

Prandaj gjatë muajve të ardhshëm, Kremlini duhet t’i kushtojë më shumë vëmendje problemeve të tij të brendshme, zhgënjimit të të gjithë segmenteve të shoqërisë ruse, të cilat deri më tani kanë qenë dytësore në raport me axhendën ushtarake.

Nga ana tjetër, diktatura mbi 20-vjeçare e Putinit është ndërtuar kryesisht në 2 linja:frika dhe paraja. “Ai bleu ata që mund të blinte dhe burgosi ose vrau ata që nuk mundi”- shkroi Thomas Friedman në New York Times disa javë më parë.

Por brenda 1 viti e gjysmë atmosfera e pathyeshmërisë që kishte krijuar autokrati, edhe nëse nuk është zhdukur, të paktën është dobësuar. “Për këtë arsye - shton Friedman - Perëndimi ka shumë arsye të frikësohet. Sepse një Rusi edhe më e paqëndrueshme është si një bombë me sahat që shtrihet në 11 zona kohore.

Putini ka marrë peng të gjithë botën:nëse fiton, Rusia humbet siç ka humbur deri tani, por nëse humbet dhe pasardhësi është kaosi, nga ky skenar humbet e gjithë bota. Perëndimi mund të ndërhyjë vetëm në mënyrë indirekte në dinamikën e brendshme të Rusisë.

Dhe është kjo arsyeja pse Evropa dhe Shtetet e Bashkuara po përqendrohen tek sanksionet dhe mbështetja ekonomike, ushtarake dhe politike për Ukrainën, e cila nuk mund të lihet vetëm përkrah një gjiganti gjithnjë e më të rrezikshëm.

Beyond giving aid to Ukraine, we need to start thinking about how Russia's domestic chaos might affect the various unresolved conflicts that the Putin regime has created across the region. Russian occupations of the Transnistria region in Moldova, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, may become increasingly tenuous, and there may be a chance for these countries to regain their territorial sovereignty.

Foreign Policy writes in a recent analysis that if Putin falls, the control of Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko over his country could weaken, and Azerbaijan could try to remove Russian troops on its territory that have been there since the second war. on the control of Nagorno-Karabakh developed 3 years ago./ Adapted from CNA